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Abstract
How is mind related to matter? This ancient question in philoso-
phy is rapidly becoming a core problem in science, perhaps the most
important of all because it probes the essential nature of man himself.
The origin of the problem is a conflict between the mechanical concep-
tion of human beings that arises from the precepts of classical physical
theory and the very different idea that arises from our intuition: the
former reduces each of us to an automaton, while the latter allows
our thoughts to guide our actions. The dominant contemporary ap-
proaches to the problem attempt to resolve this conflict by clinging to
the classical concepts, and trying to explain away our misleading in-
tuition. But a detailed argument given here shows why, in a scientific
approach to this problem, it is necessary to use the more basic princi-
ples of quantum physics, which bring the observer into the dynamics,
rather than to accept classical precepts that are profoundly incorrect
precisely at the crucial point of the role of human consciousness in
the dynamics of human brains. Adherence to the quantum principles
yields a dynamical theory of the mind/brain/body system that is in
close accord with our intuitive idea of what we are. In particular, the
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need for a self-observing quantum system to pose certain questions cre-
ates a causal opening that allows mind/brain dynamics to have three
distinguishable but interlocked causal processes, one micro-local, one
stochastic, and the third experiential. The classical approximation
reduces this tripartite quantum process to a single deterministic local
process: setting Planck’s constant to zero eliminates the dynamical
fine structure wherein the effect of mind on matter lies.
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Shifting the Paradigm
A controversy is raging today about the power of our minds. Intuitively
we know that our conscious thoughts can guide our actions. Yet the chief
philosophies of our time proclaim, in the name of science, that we are me-
chanical systems governed, fundamentally, entirely by impersonal laws that
operate at the level of our microscopic constituents.
The question of the nature of the relationship between conscious thoughts
and physical actions is called the mind-body problem. Old as philosophy it-
self it was brought to its present form by the rise, during the seventeenth
century, of what is called ‘modern science’. The ideas of Galileo Galilei,
Reneˆ Descartes, and Isaac Newton created a magnificent edifice known as
classical physical theory, which was completed by the work of James Clerk
Maxwell and Albert Einstein. The central idea is that the physical universe
is composed of “material” parts that are localizable in tiny regions, and that
all motion of matter is completely determined by matter alone, via local uni-
versal laws. This local character of the laws is crucial. It means that each
tiny localized part responds only to the states of its immediate neighbors:
each local part “feels” or “knows about” nothing outside its immediate mi-
croscopic neighborhood. Thus the evolution of the physical universe, and of
every system within the physical universe, is governed by a vast collection of
local processes, each of which is ‘myopic’ in the sense that it ‘sees’ only its
immediate neighbors.
The problem is that if this causal structure indeed holds then there is
no need for our human feelings and knowings. These experiential qualities
clearly correspond to large-scale properties of our brains. But if the entire
causal process is already completely determined by the ‘myopic’ process pos-
tulated by classical physical theory, then there is nothing for any unified
graspings of large-scale properties to do. Indeed, there is nothing that they
can do that is not already done by the myopic processes. Our conscious
thoughts thus become prisoners of impersonal microscopic processes: we are,
1
according to this “scientific” view, mechanical robots, with a mysterious dan-
gling appendage, a stream of conscious thoughts that can grasp large-scale
properties as wholes, but exert, as a consequence of these graspings, nothing
not done already by the microscopic constituents.
The enormous empirical success of classical physical theory during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has led many twentieth-century philoso-
phers to believe that the problem with consciousness is how to explain it
away: how to discredit our misleading intuition by identifying it as product
of human confusion, rather than recognizing the physical effects of conscious-
ness as a physical problem that needs to be answered in dynamical terms.
That strategy of evasion is, to be sure, about the only course available within
the strictures imposed by classical physical theory.
Detailed proposals abound for how to deal with this problem created
by adoption of the classical-physics world view. The influential philosopher
Daniel Dennett (1994, p.237) claims that our normal intuition about con-
sciousness is “like a benign user illusion” or “a metaphorical by-product of
the way our brains do their approximating work”. Eliminative materialists
such as Richard Rorty (1979) hold that mental phenomena, such as conscious
experiences, simply do not exist. Proponents of the popular ‘Identity Theory
of Mind’ grant that conscious experiences do exist, but claim each experience
to be identical to some brain process. Epiphenomenal dualists hold that our
conscious experiences do exist, and are not identical to material processes,
but have no effect on anything we do: they are epiphenomenal.
Dennett (1994, p.237) described the recurring idea that pushed him to
his counter-intuitive conclusion: “a brain was always going to do what it was
caused to do by local mechanical disturbances.” This passage lays bare the
underlying presumption behind his own theorizing, and undoubtedly behind
the theorizing of most non-physicists who ponder this matter, namely the
presumptive essential correctness of the idea of the physical world foisted
upon us by the assumptions of classical physical theory.
It has become now widely appreciated that assimilation by the general
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public of this “scientific” view, according to which each human being is basi-
cally a mechanical robot, is likely to have a significant and corrosive impact
on the moral fabric of society. Dennett speaks of the Spectre of Creeping
Exculpation: recognition of the growing tendency of people to exonerate
themselves by arguing that it is not “I” who is at fault, but some mechanical
process within: “my genes made me do it”; or “my high blood-sugar content
made me do it.” [Recall the infamous “Twinkie Defense” that got Dan White
off with five years for murdering San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and
Supervisor Harvey Milk.]
Steven Pinker (1997, p.55) also defends a classical-type conception of
the brain, and, like Dennett, recognizes the important need to reconcile the
science-based idea of causation with a rational conception of personal re-
sponsibility. His solution is to regard science and ethics as two self-contained
systems: “Science and morality are separate spheres of reasoning. Only by
recognizing them as separate can we have them both.” And “The cloister-
ing of scientific and moral reasoning also lies behind my recurring metaphor
of the mind as machine, of people as robots.” But he then decries “the
doctrines of postmodernism, poststructuralism, and deconstructionism, ac-
cording to which objectivity is impossible, meaning is self-contradictory, and
reality is socially constructed.” Yet are not the ideas he decries a product of
the contradiction he embraces? Self-contradiction is a bad seed that bears
relativism as its evil fruit.
The current welter of conflicting opinion about the mind-brain connection
suggests that a paradigm shift is looming. But it will require a major foun-
dational shift. For powerful thinkers have, for three centuries, been attacking
this problem from every angle within the bounds defined by the precepts of
classical physical theory, and no consensus has emerged.
Two related developments of great potential importance are now occur-
ring. On the experimental side, there is an explosive proliferation of empirical
studies of the relations between a subject’s brain process — as revealed by
instrumental probes of diverse kinds — and the experiences he reports. On
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the theoretical side, there is a growing group of physicists who believe al-
most all thinking on this issue during the past few centuries to be logically
unsound, because it is based implicitly on the precepts of classical physical
theory, which are now known to be fundamentally incorrect. Contemporary
physical theory differs profoundly from classical physical theory precisely on
the nature of the dynamical linkage between minds and physical states.
William James (1893, p.486), writing at the end of the nineteenth century,
said of the scientists who would one day illuminate the mind-body problem:
“the best way in which we can facilitate their advent is to understand
how great is the darkness in which we grope, and never forget that the
natural-science assumptions with which we started are provisional and revis-
able things.”
How wonderfully prescient!
It is now well known that the precepts of classical physical theory are
fundamentally incorrect. Classical physical theory has been superceded by
quantum theory, which reproduces all of the empirical successes of classical
physical theory, and succeeds also in every known case where the predictions
of classical physical theory fail. Yet even though quantum theory yields
all the correct predictions of classical physical theory, its representation of
the physical aspects of nature is profoundly different from that of classical
physical theory. And the most essential difference concerns precisely the
connection between physical states and consciousness.
My thesis here is that the difficulty with the traditional attempts to un-
derstand the mind-brain system lies primarily with the physics assumptions,
and only secondarily with the philosophy: once the physics assumptions are
rectified the philosophy will take care of itself. A correct understanding of
the mind/matter connection cannot be based on a conception of the physical
aspects of nature that is profoundly mistaken precisely at the critical point,
namely the role of consciousness in the dynamics of physical systems.
Contemporary science, rationally pursued, provides an essentially new
understanding of the mind/brain system. This revised understanding is in
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close accord with our intuitive understanding of that system: no idea of a
“benign user illusion” arises, nor any counter-intuitive idea that a conscious
thought is identical to a collection of tiny objects moving about in some
special kind of way.
Let it be said, immediately, that this solution lies not in the invocation
of quantum randomness: a significant dependence of human action on ran-
dom chance would be far more destructive of any rational notion of personal
responsibility than microlocal causation ever was.
The solution hinges not on quantum randomness, but rather on the dy-
namical effects within quantum theory of the intention and attention of the
observer.
But how did physicists ever manage to bring conscious thoughts into the
dynamics of physical systems? That is an interesting tale.
The World as Knowings
In his book “The creation of quantum mechanics and the Bohr- Pauli
dialogue” the historian John Hendry (1984) gives a detailed account of the
fierce struggles, during the first quarter of this century, by such eminent
thinkers as Hilbert, Jordan, Weyl, von Neumann, Born, Einstein, Sommer-
feld, Pauli, Heisenberg, Schroedinger, Dirac, Bohr and others, to come up
with a rational way of comprehending the data from atomic experiments.
Each man had his own bias and intuitions, but in spite of intense effort no
rational comprehension was forthcoming. Finally, at the 1927 Solvay confer-
ence a group including Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Dirac, and Born come into
concordance on a solution that came to be called “The Copenhagen Inter-
pretation”. Hendry says: “Dirac, in discussion, insisted on the restriction
of the theory’s application to our knowledge of a system, and on its lack of
ontological content.” Hendry summarized the concordance by saying: “On
this interpretation it was agreed that, as Dirac explained, the wave function
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represented our knowledge of the system, and the reduced wave packets our
more precise knowledge after measurement.”
Let there be no doubt about this key point, namely that the mathematical
theory was asserted to be directly about our knowledge itself, not about some
imagined-to-exist world of particles and fields.
Heisenberg (1958a): “The conception of objective reality of the elemen-
tary particles has thus evaporated not into the cloud of some obscure new
reality concept but into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that rep-
resents no longer the behavior of particles but rather our knowledge of this
behavior.”
Heisenberg (1958b): “...the act of registration of the result in the mind
of the observer. The discontinuous change in the probability function...takes
place with the act of registration, because it is the discontinuous change
in our knowledge in the instant of registration that has its image in the
discontinuous change of the probability function.”
Heisenberg (1958b:) “When the old adage ‘Natura non facit saltus’ is
used as a basis of a criticism of quantum theory, we can reply that certainly
our knowledge can change suddenly, and that this fact justifies the use of the
term ‘quantum jump’. ”
Wigner (1961): “the laws of quantum mechanics cannot be formulated ...
without recourse to the concept of consciousness.”
Bohr (1934): “In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose
the real essence of phenomena but only to track down as far as possible
relations between the multifold aspects of our experience.”
Certainly this profound shift in physicists’ conception of the basic nature
of their endeavor, and the meanings of their formulas, was not a frivolous
move: it was a last resort. The very idea that in order to comprehend atomic
phenomena one must abandon ontology, and construe the mathematical for-
mulas to be directly about the knowledge of human observers, rather than
about the external real events themselves, is so seemingly preposterous that
no group of eminent and renowned scientists would ever embrace it except as
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an extreme last measure. Consequently, it would be frivolous of us simply to
ignore a conclusion so hard won and profound, and of such apparent direct
bearing on our effort to understand the connection of our knowings to our
physical actions.
This monumental shift in the thinking of scientists was an epic event in
the history of human thought. Since the time of the ancient Greeks the
central problem in understanding the nature of reality, and our role in it,
has been the puzzling separation of nature into two seemingly very different
parts, mind and matter. This had led to the divergent approaches of Idealism
and Materialism. According to the precepts of Idealism our ideas, thoughts,
sensations, feelings, and other experiential realities, are the only realities
whose existence is certain, and they should be taken as basic. But then
the enduring external structure normally imagined to be carried by matter
is difficult to fathom. Materialism, on the other hand, claims that matter
is basic. But if one starts with matter then it is difficult to understand
how something like your experience of the redness of a red apple can be
constructed out of it, or why the experiential aspect of reality should exist at
all if, as classical mechanics avers, the material aspect is causally complete
by itself. There seems to be no rationally coherent way to comprehend the
relationship between our thoughts and the thoughtless atoms that external
reality was imagined to consist of.
Einstein never accepted the Copenhagen interpretation. He said:
“What does not satisfy me, from the standpoint of principle, is its attitude
toward what seems to me to be the programmatic aim of all physics: the
complete description of any (individual) real situation (as it supposedly exists
irrespective of any act of observation or substantiation).” (Einstein, 1951,
p.667)
and
“What I dislike in this kind of argumentation is the basic positivistic
attitude, which from my view is untenable, and which seems to me to come
to the same thing as Berkeley’s principle, esse est percipi.” (Einstein, 1951,
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p. 669).[Translation: To be is to be perceived]
Einstein struggled until the end of his life to get the observer’s knowledge
back out of physics. But he did not succeed! Rather he admitted that:
“It is my opinion that the contemporary quantum theory...constitutes an
optimum formulation of the [statistical] connections.” (ibid. p. 87).
He referred to:
“the most successful physical theory of our period, viz., the statistical
quantum theory which, about twenty-five years ago took on a logically con-
sistent form. ... This is the only theory at present which permits a unitary
grasp of experiences concerning the quantum character of micro-mechanical
events.” (ibid p. 81).
One can adopt the cavalier attitude that these profound difficulties with
the classical conception of nature are just some temporary retrograde aber-
ration in the forward march of science. Or one can imagine that there is
simply some strange confusion that has confounded our best minds for seven
decades, and that their absurd findings should be ignored because they do
not fit our intuitions. Or one can try to say that these problems concern only
atoms and molecules, and not things built out of them. In this connection
Einstein said:
“But the ‘macroscopic’ and ‘microscopic’ are so inter-related that it ap-
pears impracticable to give up this program [of basing physics on the ‘real’]
in the ‘microscopic’ alone.” (ibid, p.674).
What Is Really Happening?
Orthodox quantum theory is pragmatic: it is a practical tool based on
human knowings. It takes our experiences as basic, and judges theories on
the basis of how well they work for us, without trying to attribute any reality
to the entities of the theory, beyond the reality for us that they acquire from
their success in allowing us to find rational order in the structure of our past
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experiences, and to form sound expectations about the consequences of our
possible future actions.
But the opinion of many physicists, including Einstein, is that the proper
task of scientists is to try to construct a rational theory of nature that is not
based on so small a part of the natural world as human knowledge. John
Bell opined that we physicists ought to try to do better than that.
The question thus arises as to what is ‘really happening’.
Heisenberg (1958) answered this question in the following way:
“Since through the observation our knowledge of the system has changed
discontinuously, its mathematical representation also has undergone the dis-
continuous change, and we speak of a ‘quantum jump’.”
“A real difficulty in understanding the interpretation occurs when one
asks the famous question: But what happens ‘really’ in an atomic event?”
“If we want to describe what happens in an atomic event, we have to
realize that the word ‘happens’ can apply only to the observation, not to
the state of affairs between the two observations. It [ the word ‘happens’ ]
applies to the physical, not the psychical act of observation, and we may say
that the transition from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ takes place as soon as
the interaction of the object with the measuring device, and therefore with
the rest of the world, has come into play; it is not connected with the act
of registration of the result in the mind of the observer. The discontinuous
change in the probability function, however, occurs with the act of registra-
tion, because it is the discontinuous change in our knowledge in the instant of
recognition that has its image in the discontinuous change in the probability
function.”
This explanation uses two distinct modes of description. One is a prag-
matic knowledge-based description in terms of the Copenhagen concept of
the discontinuous change of the quantum-theoretic probability function at
the registration of new knowledge in the mind of the observer. The other is
an ontological description in terms of ‘possible’ and ‘actual’, and ‘interaction
of object with the measuring device’. The latter description is an informal
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supplement to the strict Copenhagen interpretation. I say ‘informal sup-
plement’ because this ontological part is not tied into quantum theoretical
formalism in any precise way. It assuages the physicists’ desire for an intu-
itive understanding of what could be going on behind the scenes, without
actually interfering with the workings of the pragmatic set of rules.
Heisenberg’s transition from ‘the possible’ to ‘the actual’ at the dumb
measuring device was shown to be a superfluous and needless complication
by von Neumann’s analysis of the quantum process of measurement (von
Neumann, 1932, Chapter VI). I shall discuss that work later, but note here
only the key conclusion. von Neumann introduced the measuring instru-
ments and the body/brains of the community of human observers into the
quantum state, which is quantum theory’s only representation of “physical
reality”. He then showed that if an observer experiences the fact that, for
example, ‘the pointer on a measuring device has swung to the right’, then
this increment in the observer’s knowledge can be associated exclusively with
a reduction (i.e., sudden change) of the state of the brain of that observer
to the part of that brain state that is compatible with his new knowledge.
No change or reduction of the quantum state at the dumb measuring device
is needed: no change in “knowledge” occurs there. This natural association
of human “knowings” with events in human brains allows the ‘rules’ of the
Copenhagen interpretation pertaining to “our knowledge” to be represented
in a natural ontological framework. Indeed, any reduction event at the mea-
suring device itself would, strictly speaking, disrupt in principle the validity
of the predictions of quantum theory. Thus the only natural ontological place
to put the reduction associated with the increases in knowledge upon which
the Copenhagen interpretation is built is in the brain of the person whose
knowledge is increased.
My purpose in what follows is to reconcile the insight of the founders of
quantum theory, namely that the mathematical formalism of quantum the-
ory is about our knowledge, with the demand of Einstein that basic physical
theory be about nature herself. I shall achieve this reconciliation by incorpo-
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rating human beings, including both their body/brains and their conscious
experiences, into the quantum mechanical description of nature.
The underlying commitment here is to the basic quantum principle that
information is the currency of reality, not matter: the universe is an informa-
tional structure, not a substantive one. This fact is becoming ever more clear
in the empirical studies of the validity of the concepts of quantum theory in
the context of complex experiments with simple combinations of correlated
quantum systems, and in the related development of quantum information
processing. Information-based language works beautifully, but substance-
based language does not work at all..
Mind/Brain Dynamics: Why Quantum Theory Is Needed
A first question confronting a classically biased mind-brain researcher is
this: How can two things so differently described and conceived as substantive
matter and conscious thoughts interact in any rationally controlled and sci-
entifically acceptable way. Within the classical framework this is impossible.
Thus the usual tack has been to abandon or modify the classical conception
of mind while clinging tenaciously to the “scientifically established” classical
idea of matter, even in the face of knowledge that the classical idea of matter
is now known by scientists to be profoundly and fundamentally mistaken,
and mistaken not only on the microscopic scale, but on the scale of meters
and kilometers as well (Tittel, 1998). Experiments show that our experiences
of instruments cannot possibly be just the passive witnessing of macroscopic
physical realities that exist and behave in the way that the ideas of classical
physical theory say that macroscopic physical realities ought to exist and
behave.
Scientists and philosophers intent on clinging to familiar classical concepts
normally argue at this point that whereas long-range quantum effects can be
exhibited under rigorous conditions of isolation and control, all quantum
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effects will be wiped out in warm wet brains on a very small scale, and hence
classical concepts will be completely adequate to deal with the question of
the relationship between our conscious thoughts and the large-scale brain
activities with which they are almost certainly associated.
That argument is incorrect. The emergence of classical-type relation-
ships arise from interactions between a system and its environment. These
interactions induce correlations between this system and its environment
that make certain typical quantum interference effects difficult to observe
in practice, and that allow certain practical computations to be simplified
by substituting a classical system for a quantum one. However, these cor-
relation (decoherence) effects definitely do not entail the true emergence —
even approximately — of a single classically describable system. (Zurek,
1986, p.89 and Joos, 1986, p.12). In particular, if the subsystem of interest
is a brain then interactions between its parts produce a gigantic jumble of
partially interfering classical-type states: no single approximately classical
reality emerges. Yet if no — even-approximate — single classical reality
emerges at any macroscopic scale, but only a jumble of partially interfering
quantum states, then the investigation of an issue as basic as the nature of
the mind-brain connection ought in principle to be pursued within an exact
framework, rather than crippling the investigation from the outset by replac-
ing correct principles by concepts known to be fundamentally and grossly
false, just because they allow certain practical computations to be simplified.
This general argument is augmented by a more detailed examination of
the present case. The usual argument for the approximate pragmatic validity
of a classical conceptualization of a system is based on assumptions about
the nature of the question that is put to nature. The assumption in the
usual case is that this question will be about something like the position
of a visible object. Then one has a clear separation of the world into its
pertinent parts: the unobservable atomic subsystem, the observable features
of the instrument, and unobserved features of the environment, including
unobserved micro-features of the instrument. The empirical question is about
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the observable features of the instrument. These features are essentially just
the overall position and orientation of a visible object.
But the central issue in the present context is precisely the character of
the brain states that are associated with conscious experiences. It is not
known a priori whether or how a self-observing quantum system separates
into these various parts. It is not clear, a priori, that a self-observing brain
can be separated into components analogous to observer, observee, and en-
vironment. Consequently, one cannot rationally impose prejudicial assump-
tions — based on pragmatic utility in simple cases in which the quantum
system and measuring instrument are two distinct systems both external to
the human observer, and strongly coupled to an unobservable environment
— in this vastly different present case, in which the quantum system being
measured, the observing instrument, and “the observer” are aspects of one
unified body/brain/mind system observing itself.
In short, the practical utility of classical concepts in certain special situ-
ations arises from the very special forms of the empirical questions that are
to be asked in those situations. Consequently, one must revert to the basic
physical principles in this case where the special conditions of separation fail,
and the nature of the questions put to nature can therefore be quite different.
The issue here is not whether distinct objects that we observe via our
senses can be treated as classical objects. It is whether in the description
of the complex inner workings of a thinking human brain it is justifiable to
assume — not just for certain simple practical purposes, but as a matter of
principle — that this brain is made up of tiny interacting parts of a kind
known not to exist.
The only rational scientific way to proceed in this case of a mind/brain
observing itself is to start from basic quantum theory, not from a theory that
is known to be profoundly incorrect.
The vonNeumann/Wigner “orthodox” quantum formalism that I employ
automatically and neatly encompasses all quantum and classical predictions,
including the transition domains between them. It automatically incorpo-
13
rates all decoherence effects, and the partial “classicalization” effects that
they engender.
vonNeumann/Wigner Quantum Theory
Wigner used the word “orthodox” to describe the formulation of quan-
tum theory developed by von Neumann. It can be regarded as a partial
ontologicalization of its predecessor, Copenhagen quantum theory.
The central concept of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory,
as set forth by the founders at the seminal Solvay conference of 1927, is that
the basic mathematical entity of the theory, the quantum state of a system,
represents “our knowledge” of the system, and the reduced state represents
our more precise knowledge after measurement.
In the strict Copenhagen view, the quantum state is always the state of a
limited system that does not include the instruments that we use to prepare
that system or later to measure it. Our relevant experiences are those that
we described as being our observations of the observable features of these
instruments.
To use the theory one needs relationships between the mathematical quan-
tities of the theory and linguistic specifications on the observable features of
the instruments. These specifications are couched in the language that we
use to communicate to our technically trained associates what we have done
(how we have constructed our instruments, and put them in place) and what
we have learned (which outcomes have appeared to us). Thus pragmatic
quantum theory makes sense only when regarded as a part of a larger en-
veloping language that allows us describe to each other the dispositions of
the instruments and ordinary objects that are relevant to the application we
make. The connections between these linguistic specifications and the math-
ematical quantities of the theory are fixed, fundamentally, by the empirical
calibrations of our instruments.
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These calibration procedures do not, however, fully exploit all that we
know about the atomic properties of the instruments.
That Bohr was sensitive to this deficiency, is shown by following passage:
“On closer consideration, the present formulation of quantum mechanics,
in spite of its great fruitfulness, would yet seem no more than a first step
in the necessary generalization of the classical mode of description, justified
only by the possibility of disregarding in its domain of application the atomic
structure of the measuring instruments. For a correlation of still deeper lying
laws of nature ... this last assumption can no longer be maintained and we
must be prepared for a ... still more radical renunciation of the usual claims
of so-called visualization. (Bohr, 1936, p,293-4)”
Bohr was aware of the work in this direction by John von Neumann
(1932), but believed von Neumann to be on a wrong track. Yet the opinion
of many other physicists is that von Neumann made the right moves: he
brought first the measuring instruments, and eventually the entire physical
universe, including the human observers themselves, into the physical system
represented by the quantum state. The mathematical theory allows one to
do this, and it is unnatural and problematic to do otherwise: any other
choice would be an artifact, and would create problems associated with an
artificial separation of the unified physical system into differently described
parts. This von Neumann approach, in contrast to the Copenhagen approach,
allows the quantum theory to be applied both to cosmological problems, and
to the mind-body problem.
Most efforts to improve upon the original Copenhagen quantum theory
are based on von Neumann’s formulation. That includes the present work.
However, almost every other effort to modify the Copenhagen formulation
aims to improve it by removing the consciousness of the observer from quan-
tum theory: they seek to bring quantum theory in line with the basic philos-
ophy of the superceded classical theory, in which consciousness is imagined
to be a disconnected passive witness.
I see no rationale for this retrograde move. Why should we impose on our
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understanding of nature the condition that consciousness not be an integral
part of it, or an unrealistic stricture of impotence that is belied by the deepest
testimony of human experience, and is justified only by a theory now known
to be fundamentally false, when the natural form of the superceding theory
makes experience efficacious?
I follow, therefore, the von Neumann/Wigner [vN/W] formulation, in
which the entire physical world is represented by a quantum mechanical
state, and each thinking human being is recognized as an aspect of the total
reality: each thinking human being is a body/brain/mind system, consisting
of a sequence of conscious events, called knowings, bound together by the
physical structure that is his body/brain.
However, the basic idea, and the basic rules, of Copenhagen quantum
theory are strictly maintained: the quantum state continues to represent
knowledge, and each experiential increment in knowledge, or knowing, is
accompanied by a reduction of the quantum state to a form compatible with
that increase in knowledge.
By keeping these connections intact one retains both the close pragmatic
link between the theory and empirical knowledge, which is entailed by the
quantum rules, and also the dynamical efficacy of conscious experiences,
which follows from the action of the ‘reduction of the quantum state’ that,
according to the quantum rules, is the image in the physical world of the
conscious event.
In this theory, each conscious event has as its physical image not a re-
duction of the state of some small physical system that is external to the
body/brain of the person to whom the experience belongs, as specified by
the Copenhagen approach. Rather, the reduction is in that part of the state
of the universe that constitutes the state of the body/brain of the person to
whom the experience belongs: the reduction actualizes the pattern of activity
that is sometimes called the “neural correlate” of that conscious experience.
The theory thus ties in a practical way into the vast field of mind-brain re-
search: i.e., into studies of the correlations between, on the one hand, brain
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activities of a subject, as measured by instrumental probes and described in
physical terms, and, on the other hand, the subjective experiences, as re-
ported by the subject, and described in the language of “folk psychology”
[i.e., in terms of feelings, beliefs, desires, perceptions, and the other psycho-
logical features.]
My aim now is to show in more detail how the conscious intentions of a
human being can influence the activities of his brain. To do this I must first
explain the two important roles of the quantum observer.
The Two Roles of the Quantum Observer
Most readers will have heard of the Schroedinger equation: it is the quan-
tum analog of Newton’s and Maxwell’s equations of motion of classical me-
chanics. The Schroedinger equation, like Newton’s and Maxwell’s equations,
is deterministic: given the motion of the quantum state for all times prior to
the present, the motion for all future time is fixed, insofar as the Schroedinger
equation is satisfied for all times.
However, the Schroedinger equation fails when an increment of knowledge
occurs: then there is a sudden jump to a ‘reduced’ state, which represents
the new state of knowledge. This jump involves the well-known element of
quantum randomness.
A superficial understanding of quantum theory might easily lead one to
conclude that the entire dynamics is controlled by just the combination of
the local-deterministic Schroedinger equation and the elements of quantum
randomness. If that were true then our conscious experiences would again
become epiphenomenal side-shows.
To see beyond this superficial appearance one must look more closely at
the two roles of the observer in quantum theory.
Niels Bohr (1951, p.223), in recounting the important events at the Solvay
Conference of 1927, says:
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“On that occasion an interesting discussion arose also about how to speak
of the appearance of phenomena for which only predictions of a statistical
nature can be made. The question was whether, as regards the occurrence
of individual events, we should adopt the terminology proposed by Dirac,
that we have to do with a choice on the part of ‘nature’ or, as suggested
by Heisenberg, we should say that we have to do with a choice on the part
of the ‘observer’ constructing the measuring instruments and reading their
recording.”
Bohr stressed this choice on part of the observer:
“...our possibility of handling the measuring instruments allow us only to
make a choice between the different complementary types of phenomena we
want to study.”
The observer in quantum theory does more than just read the record-
ings. He also chooses which question will be put to Nature: which aspect of
nature his inquiry will probe. I call this important function of the observer
‘The Heisenberg Choice’, to contrast it with the ‘Dirac Choice’, which is the
random choice on the part of Nature that Dirac emphasized.
According to quantum theory, the Dirac Choice is a choice between alter-
natives that are specified by the Heisenberg Choice: the observer must first
specify what aspect of the system he intends to measure or probe, and then
put in place an instrument that will probe that aspect.
In quantum theory it is the observer who both poses the question, and
recognizes the answer. Without some way of specifying what the question is,
the quantum rules will not work: the quantum process grinds to a halt.
Nature does not answer, willy-nilly, all questions: it answers only properly
posed questions.
A question put to Nature must be one with a Yes-or-No answer, or a
sequence of such questions. The question is never of the form “Where will
object O turn out to be?”, where the possibilities range in a smooth way over
a continuum of values. The question is rather of a form such as: “Will the
center of object O — perhaps the pointer on some instrument — be found by
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the observer to lie in the interval between 6 and 7 on some specified ‘dial’?”
The human observer poses such a question, which must be such that the
answer Yes is experientially recognizable. Nature then delivers the answer,
Yes or No. Nature’s answers are asserted by quantum theory to conform to
certain statistical conditions, which are determined jointly by the question
posed and the form of the prior state (of the body/brain of the observer.)
The observer can examine the answers that Nature gives, in a long sequence
of trials with similar initial conditions, and check the statistical prediction of
the theory.
This all works well at the pragmatic Copenhagen level, where the ob-
server stands outside the quantum system, and is simply accepted for what
he empirically is and does. But what happens when we pass to the vN/W on-
tology? The observer then no longer stands outside the quantum system: he
becomes a dynamical body/brain/mind system that is an integral dynamical
part of the quantum universe.
The basic problem that originally forced the founders of quantum theory
to bring the human observers into the theory was that the evolution of the
state via the Schroedinger equation does not fix or specify where and when
the question is posed, or what the question actually is. This problem was
resolved by placing this issue in the hands and mind of the external human
observer.
Putting the observer inside the system does not, by itself, resolve this
basic problem: the Schroedinger evolution alone remains unable to specify
what the question is. Indeed, this bringing of the human observer into the
quantum system intensifies the problem, because there is no longer the option
of shifting the problem away, to some outside agent. Rather, the problem is
brought to a head, because the human agent is precisely the quantum system
that is under investigation.
In the Copenhagen formulation the Heisenberg choice was made by the
mind of the external human observer. I call this process of choosing the
question the Heisenberg process. In the vN/W formulation this choice is
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not made by the local deterministic Schroedinger process and the global
stochastic Dirac process. So there is still an essential need for a third process,
the Heisenberg process. Thus the agent’s mind can continue to play its
key role. But the mind of the human agent is now an integral part of the
dynamical body/brain/mind. We therefore have, now, an intrinsically more
complex dynamical situation, one in which a person’s conscious thoughts can
— and evidently must, if no new element is brought in, — play a role that
is not reducible to the combination of the Schroedinger and Dirac processes.
In an evolving human brain governed by ionic concentrations and electric-
magnetic field gradients, and other continuous field-like properties, rather
than sharply defined properties, or discrete well-defined “branches” of the
wave function, the problem of specifying, within this amorphous and diffusive
context, the well-defined question that is put to nature is quite nontrivial.
Having thus identified this logical opening for efficacious human mental
action, I now proceed to fill in the details of how it might work.
How Conscious Thoughts Could Influence Brain Process
Information is the currency of reality. That is the basic message of quan-
tum theory.
The basic unit of information is the “bit”: the answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to
some specific question.
In quantum theory the answer ‘Yes’ to a posed question is associated
with an operator P that depends on the question. The defining property
of a projection operator is that P squared equals P : asking the very same
question twice it is the same as asking it once. The operator associated with
the answer ‘No’ to this same question is 1− P . Note that (1− P ) is also a
projection operator: (1− P )2 = 1− 2P + P 2 = 1− 2P + P = (1− P ).
To understand the meaning of these operators P and (1−P ) it is helpful
to imagine a trivial classical example. Suppose a motionless classical heavy
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point-like particle is known to be in a box that is otherwise empty. Suppose a
certain probability function F represents all that you know about the location
of this particle. Suppose you then send some light through the left half of the
box that will detect the particle if it is in the left half of the box, but not tell
you anything about where in the left half of the box the particle lies. Suppose,
moreover, that the position of the particle is undisturbed by this observation.
Then let P be the operator that acting on any function f sets that function
to zero in the right half of the box, but leaves it unchanged in the left half of
the box. Note that two applications of P has exactly the same effect as one
application, P 2 = P . The question put to nature by your probing experiment
is: “Do you now know that particle is in the left half of the box? Then the
function PF represents, apart from an overall normalization factor, your new
state of knowledge if the answer to the posed question was YES. Likewise,
the function (1-P)F represents, apart from overall normalization, the new
probability function, if the answer was NO.
The quantum counterpart of F is the operator S. Operators are like func-
tions that do not commute: the order in which you apply them matters. The
analog of PF ≡ PFP is PSP , and the analog of (1−P )F ≡ (1−P )F (1−P )
is (1− P )S(1− P ).
This is how the quantum state represents information and knowledge,
and how increments in knowledge affect the quantum state.
I have described in my book (Stapp, 1993, Ch 6) my conception of how
the quantum mind/brain works. It rests on some ideas/findings of William
James.
William James(1910, p.1062) says that:
“a discrete composition is what actually obtains in our perceptual expe-
rience. We either perceive nothing, or something that is there in sensible
amount. This fact is what in psychology is known as the law of the ‘thresh-
old’. Either your experience is of no content, of no change, or it is of a
perceptual amount of content or change. Your acquaintance with reality
grows literally by buds or drops of perception. Intellectually and on reflec-
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tion you can divide these into components, but as immediately given they
come totally or not at all.”
This wholeness of each perceptual experience is a main conclusion, and
theme, of Jamesian psychology. It fits neatly with the quantum ontology.
Given a well posed question about the world to which one’s attention is
directed quantum theory says that nature either gives the affirmative answer,
in which case there occurs an experience describable as “Yes, I perceive it!”
or, alternatively, no experience occurs in connection with that question.
In vN/W theory the ‘Yes’ answer is represented by a projection operator
P that acts on the degrees of freedom of the brain of the observer, and
reduces the state of this brain — and also the state S of the universe — to
one compatible with that answer ‘Yes’: S is reduced to PSP. If the answer
is ‘No’, then the projection operator (1 − P ) is applied to the state S: S is
reduced to (1-P)S(1-P). [See Stapp (1998b) for technical details.]
James (1890, p.257) asserts that each conscious experience, though it
comes to us whole, has a sequence of temporal components ordered in ac-
cordance with the ordering in which they have entered into one’s stream of
conscious experiences. These components are like the columns in a marching
band: at each viewing only a subset of the columns is in front of the viewing
stand. At a later viewing a new column has appeared on one end, and one
has disappeared at the other. (cf. Stapp, 1993, p. 158.) It is this possibility
of having a sequence of different components present in a single thought that
allows conscious analysis and comparisons to be made.
Infants soon grasp the concept of their bodies in interaction with a world
of persisting objects about them. This suggests that the brain of an alert
person normally contains a “neural” representation of the current state of his
body and the world about him. I assume that such a representation exists,
and call it the body-world schema. (Stapp, 1993, Ch. 6)
Consciously directed action is achieved, according to this theory, by means
of a ‘projected’ (into the future) temporal component of the thought, and
of the body-world schema actualized by the thought: the intended action
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is represented in this projected component as a mental image of the in-
tended action, and as a corresponding representation in the brain, (i.e., in
a body-world schema) of that intended action. The neural activities that
automatically flow from the associated body-world schema tend to bring the
intended bodily action into being.
The coherence and directedness of a person’s stream of consciousness
is maintained, according to this theory, because the instructions effectively
issued to the unconscious processes of the brain by the natural dynamical
unfolding that issues from the actualized body-world schema include not only
the instructions for the initiation or continuation of motor actions but also
instructions for the initiation or continuation of mental processing. This
means that the actualization associated with one thought leads physically to
the emergence of the propensities for the occurrence of the next thought, or
of later thoughts. (Stapp, 1993, Ch. 6)
The idea here is that the action — on the state S — of the projection op-
erator P that is associated with a thought T will actualize a pattern of brain
activity that will dynamically evolve in such a way as to tend to create a
subsequent state that is likely to achieve the intention of the thought T . The
natural cause of this positive correlation between the experiential intention
of the thought T and the matching confirmatory experience of a succeeding
thought T ′ is presumably set in place during the formation of brain structure,
in the course of the person’s interaction with his environment, by the rein-
forcement of brain structures that result in empirically successful pairings
between experienced intentions and subsequently experienced perceptions.
These can be physically compared because both are expressed physically by
similar body-world schemas.
As noted previously, the patterns of brain activity that are actualized by
an event unfold not only into instructions to the motor cortex to institute
intended motor actions. They unfold also into instructions for the creation
of the conditions for the next experiential event. But the Heisenberg uncer-
tainties in, for example, the locations of the atomic and ionic constituents
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of the nerve terminals, and more generally of the entire brain, necessarily
engender a quantum diffusion in the evolving state of the brain. Thus the
dynamically generated state that is the pre-condition for the next event will
not correspond exactly to a well defined unique question: some ‘scatter’ will
invariably creep in. However, a specific question must be posed in order for
the next quantum event to occur!
This problem of how to specify “the next question” is the central problem
in most attempts to ‘improve’ the Copenhagen interpretation by excluding
“the observer”. If one eliminates the observer, then something else must be
brought in to fix the next question: i.e., to make the Heisenberg choice.
The main idea here is to continue to allow the question to be posed by the
‘observer’, who is now an integral part of the quantum system: the observer
is a body/brain/mind subsystem. The Heisenberg Choice, which is the choice
of an operator P that acts macroscopically, as a unit, on the observing system,
is not fixed by the Schroedinger equation, or by the Dirac Choice, so it is
most naturally fixed by the experiential part of that system, which seems to
pertain to macroscopic aspects of brain activity taken as units.
Each experience is asserted to have an intentional aspect, which is its
experiential goal or aim, and an attentional aspect, which is an experiential
focussing on an updating of the current status of the person’s idea of his
body, mind, and environment.
When an action is initiated by some thought, part of the instruction is
normally to monitor, by attention, the ensuing action, in order to check it
against the intended action.
In order for the appropriate experiential check to occur, the appropriate
question must be asked. The intended action is formulated in experiential
terms, and the appropriate monitoring question is whether this intended
experience matches the subsequently occurring experience. This connection
has the form of the transference of an experience defined by the intentional
aspect of an earlier experience into the experiential question attended to —
i.e., posed — by a later experience.
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This way of closing the causal gap associated with the Heisenberg Choice
introduces two parallel lines of causal connection in the body/brain/mind
system. On the one hand, there is the physical line that unfolds — under
the control of the local deterministic Schroedinger equation — from a prior
event, and that generates the physical potentialities for succeeding possible
events. Acting in parallel to this physical line of causation, there is a mental
line of causation that transfers the experiential intention of an earlier event
into an experiential attention of a later event. These two causal strands, one
physical and one mental, join to form the physical and mental poles of a
succeeding quantum event.
In this model there are three intertwined factors in the causal structure:
(1), the local causal structure generated by the Schroedinger equation; (2),
the Heisenberg Choices, which is based on the experiential aspects of the
body/brain/mind subsystem that constitutes a person; and (3), the Dirac
Choices on the part of nature.
The point of all this is that there is within the vN/W ontology a logical
necessity, in order for the quantum process to proceed, for some process to
fix the Heisenberg Choice of the operator P , which acts over an extended
portion of the body/brain of the person. Neither the Schroedinger evolution
nor the Dirac stochastic choice can do the job. The only other known aspect
of the system is our conscious experience. It is possible, and natural, to use
this mind part of body/brain/mind system to produce the needed choice.
The mere logical possibility of a mind-matter interaction such as this,
within the vN/W formulation, indicates that quantum theory has the poten-
tial of permitting the experiential aspects of reality to enter into the causal
structure of body/brain/mind dynamics, and to enter in a way that is not
fully reducible to a combination of local mechanical causation specified by the
Schroedinger equation and the random quantum choices. The requirements
of quantum dynamics demand some further process, and an experienced-
based process that fits both our ideas about our psychological make up and
also the quantum rules that connect our experiences to the informational
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structure carried by the evolving physical state of the brain seems to be the
perfect candidate.
What has been achieved here is, of course, just a working out in more
detail of Wigner’s idea that quantum theory, in the von Neumann form,
allows for mind — pure conscious experience — to interact with the ‘physical’
aspect of nature, as that aspect is represented in quantum theory. What
permits this interaction is the fact that the physical aspect of nature, as it is
represented in quantum theory, is informational in character, and hence links
naturally to increments in knowledge. Because each increment in knowledge
acts directly upon the quantum state, and reduces it to the informational
structure compatible with the new knowledge, there is, right from the outset,
an action of mind on the physical world. I have just worked out a possible
scenario in more detail, and in particular have emphasized how the causal gap
associated with the Heisenberg Choice allows mind to enter into the dynamics
in a way that is quite in line with our intuition about the efficacy of our
thoughts. It is therefore simply wrong to proclaim that the findings of science
entail that our intuitions about the nature of our thoughts are necessarily
illusory or false. Rather, it is completely in line with contemporary science
to hold our thoughts to be causally efficacious, and reducible neither to the
local deterministic Schroedinger process, nor to that process combined with
stochastic Dirac choices on the part of nature.
Idealism, Materialism, and Quantum Informationism.
I have stressed just now the idea-like character of the physical state of
the universe, within vN/W quantum theory. This suggests that the theory
may conform to the tenets of idealism. This is partially true. The quantum
state undergoes, when a fact become fixed in a local region, a sudden jump
that extends over vast reaches of space. This gives the physical state the
character of a representation of knowledge rather than a representation of
substantive matter. When not jumping the state represents potentialities
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or probabilities for actual events to occur. Potentialities and probabilities
are normally conceived to be idea-like qualities, not material realities. So as
regards the intuitive conception of the intrinsic nature of what is represented
within the theory by the physical state it certainly is correct to say that it
is idea-like.
On the other hand, the physical state has a mathematical structure, and a
behaviour that is governed by the mathematical properies. It evolves much of
the time in accordance with local deterministic laws that are direct quantum
counterparts of the local deterministic laws of classical mechanics. Thus as
regards various structural and causal properties the physical state certainly
has aspects that we normally associate with matter.
So this vN/W quantum conception of nature ends up having both idea-
like and matter-like qualities. The causal law involves two complementary
modes of evolution that, at least at the present level theoretical development,
are quite distinct. One of these modes involves a gradual change that is
governed by local deterministic laws, and hence is matter-like in character.
The other mode is abrupt, and is idea-like in two respects.
This hybrid ontology can be called an information-based reality. Each
answer, Yes or No, to a quantum question is one bit of information that is
generated by a mental-type event. The physical repository of this informa-
tion is the quantum state of the universe: the new information is recorded
as a reduction of the quantum state of the universe to a new form, which
then evolves deterministically in accordance with the Schroedinger equation.
Thus, according to this quantum conception of nature, the physical universe
— represented by the quantum state — is a repository of evolving informa-
tion that has the dispositional power to create more information.
This hybrid ontology can be called an information-based reality. Each
answer. Yes or No, to a quantum question is one bit of information that
is generated by a mental-type event. This event is registered as a reduc-
tion of the quantum state of the universe to a new form. This information
is stored in this state, which evolves deterministically in accordance with
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the Schroedinger equation. Thus, according to the quantum conception, the
physical universe — represented by the quantum state — is a repository
evolving information that has the dispositional power to create more infor-
mation.
Quantum Zeno Effect and The Efficacy of Mind
In the model described above the specifically mental effects are expressed
solely through the choice and the timings of the questions posed. The ques-
tion then arises as to whether just the choices about which questions are
asked, with no control over which answers are returned, can influence the
dynamical evolution of a system.
The answer is ‘Yes’: the evolution of a quantum state can be greatly
influenced by the choices and timings of the questions put to nature.
The most striking example of this is the Quantum Zeno Effect. (Chui,
Sudarshan, and Misra, 1977, and Itano, et al. 1990). In quantum theory if
one poses repeatedly, in very rapid succession, the same Yes-or-No question,
and the answer to the first of these posings is Yes, then in the limit of very
rapid-fire posings the evolution will be confined to the subspace in which the
answer is Yes: the effective Hamiltonian will change from H to PHP, where
P is the projection operator onto the Yes states. This means that evolution
of the system is effectively “boxed in” in the subspace where the answer
continues to be Yes, if the question is posed sufficiently rapidly, even if it
would otherwise run away from that region.
This fact that the Hamiltonian is effectively changed in this macroscopic
way shows that the choices and timings of which questions are asked can
affect observable properties.
Free Will and Causation
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Personal responsibility is not reconciled with the quantum understanding
of causation by making our thoughts free, in the sense of being completely
unconstrained by anything at all. It is solved, rather, by making our thoughts
part of the causal structure of the body/brain/mind system, but a part that
is not under the complete dominion of myopic (i.e., microlocal) causation and
random chance. Our thoughts then become aspects of the causal structure
that are entwined with the micro-physical and random elements, yet are not
completely reducible to them, or replaceable by them.
Pragmatic Theory of the Mind/Brain
This vN/W theory gives a conceivable ontology. However, for practical
purposes it can be viewed as a pragmatic theory of the human psycho-physical
structure. It is deeper and more realistic than the Copenhagen version be-
cause it links our thoughts not directly to objects (instruments) in the exter-
nal world, but rather to patterns of brain activity. It provides a theoretical
structure based explicitly on the two kinds of data at our disposal, namely
the experiences of the subject, as he describes these experiences to himself
and his colleagues, and the experiences of the observers of that subject, as
they describe their experiences to themselves and their colleagues. These
two kinds of descriptions are linked together by a theoretical structure that
neatly, precisely, and automatically accounts, in a single uniform and practi-
cal way, for all known quantum and classical effects. But, in contrast to the
classical-physics based model, it has a ready-made place for an efficacious
mind, and provides a rational understanding of how such a mind could be
causally enmeshed with brain processes.
If one adopts this pragmatic view then one need never consider the ques-
tion of nonhuman minds: the theory then covers, by definition, the science
that we human beings create to account for the structure of our human ex-
periences.
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This pragmatic theory should provide satisfactory basis for a rational sci-
ence of the human mind/brain. It gives a structure that coherently combines
the psychological and physical aspect of human behavior. However, it cannot
be expected to be exactly true, for it would entail the existence of collapse
events associated with increments in human knowledge, but no analogous
events associated with non-humans.
One cannot expect our species to play such a special role in nature. So this
human-based pragmatic version must be understood, from the ontological
standpoint, as merely the first stage in the development of a better ontological
theory: one that accommodates the evolutionary precursors to the human
knowings that the pragmatic theory is based upon.
So far there is no known empirical evidence for the existence of any reduc-
tion events not associated with human knowings. This impedes, naturally,
the development of a science that encompasses such other events.
Future Developments: Representation and Replication
The primary purpose of this paper has been to describe the general
features of a pragmatic theory of the human mind/brain that allows our
thoughts to be causally efficacious yet not controlled by local-mechanistic
laws combined with random chance. Eventually, however, one would like to
expand this pragmatic version into a satisfactory ontology theory.
Human experiences are closely connected to human brains. Hence events
similar to human experiences would presumably not exist either in primitive
life forms, or before life began. Hence a more general theory that could deal
with the evolution of consciousness would presumably have to be based on
something other than the “experiential increments in knowledge” that were
the basis of the pragmatic version described above.
Dennett (1994, p.236) identified intentionality (aboutness) as a phenomenon
more fundamental than consciousness, upon which he would build his theory
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of consciousness. ‘Aboutness’ pertains to representation: the representation
of one thing in another.
The body-world schema is the brain’s representation of the body and its
environment. Thus it constitutes, in the theory of consciousness described
above, an element of “aboutness” that could be seized upon as the basis of
a more general theory.
However, there lies at the base of the quantum model described above
an even more rudimentary element: self-replication. The basic process in
the model is the creation of events that create likenesses of themselves. This
tendency of thoughts to create likenesses of themselves, helps to keep a train
of thought on track.
Abstracting from our specific model of human consciousness one sees the
skeleton of a general process of self-replication.
Fundamentally, the theory described above is a theory of events, where
each event has an attentional aspect and an intentional aspect. The at-
tentional aspect of an event specifies an item of information that fixes the
operator P associated with that event. The intentional aspect of the event
specifies the functional property injected into the dynamics by the action of
P on S. This functional property is a tendency of the Schroedinger-directed
dynamics to produce a future event whose attentional aspect is the same as
that of the event that is producing this tendency. The effect of these inter-
locking processes is to inject into the dynamics a directional tendency, based
on approximate self-replication, that acts against the chaotic diffusive ten-
dency generated by the Schroedinger equation. Such a process could occur
before the advent of our species, and of life itself, and it could contribute to
their emergence.
Conflation and Identity
A person’s thoughts and ideas appear — to that person himself — to be
able to do things: a person’s mental states seem to be able cause his body
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to move about in intended ways. Thus thoughts seem to have functional
power. Indeed, the idea of functionalism is that what makes thoughts and
other mental states what they are is precisely their functional power: e.g.,
my pain is a pain by virtue of its functional or causal relationship to other
aspects of the body/brain/mind system. Of course, this would be merely a
formal definition of the term “mental state” if it did not correspond to the
occurrence of an associated element in a person’s stream of consciousness: in
the context of the present study — of the connection between our brains and
our inner experiential lives — the occurrence of a mental state in a person’s
mind is supposed to mean the occurrence of a corresponding element in his
stream of consciousness.
The identity theory of mind claims that each mental state is identical to
some process in a brain. But combining this idea with the classical-physics
conception of the physical universe leads to problems. They stem from the
fact that the precepts of classical physical theory entail that the entire causal
structure of any complex physical system is completely determined by its mi-
croscopic physical structure alone. Alternative high-level descriptions of cer-
tain complex physical systems might be far more useful to us in practice, but
they are in principle redundant and unnecessary if the principles of classical
physics hold. Thus it is accurate to say that the heat of the flame caused the
paper to ignite, or that the tornado ripped the roofs off of the houses and
left a path of destruction. But according to the precepts of classical physical
theory the high-level causes are mere mathematical reorganizations of micro-
scopic causes that are completely explainable micro-locally within classical
physical theory. Nothing is needed beyond mathematical reorganization and
— in order for us to be able to apply the theory — the assumption that we
can empirically know, through observations via our senses,the approximate
relative locations and shapes of sufficiently large macroscopically localized
assemblies of the microscopic physical elements that the theory posits.
In the examples just described our experiences themselves are not the
causes of the ignition or destruction: our experiences merely help us to iden-
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tify the causes. In fact, the idea behind classical physical theory is that the
local physical variables of the theory represent a collection of ontologically
distinct physical realities each of whose ontological status is (1), intrinsically
microlocal, (2), ontologically independent of our experiences, and (3), dy-
namically non-dependent upon experiences. That is why quantum theory
was such a radical break with tradition: in quantum theory the physical de-
scription became enmeshed with our experiential knowledge, and the physical
state became causally dependent upon our mental states.
Quantum theory is, in this respect, somewhat similar to the identity
theory of mind: both entangle mind and physical process already at the
ontological level. But the idea of the classical identity theory of the mind
is to hang onto the classical conception of physical reality, and aver that
a correct understanding of the true nature of a conscious thought would
reveal it to be none other than a classically describable physical process that
brings about what the thought intends, given the appropriate alignment of
the relevant physical mechanisms.
That idea is, in fact, what would naturally emerge from quantum theory
in the classical limit where the difference between Planck’s constant and zero
can be ignored, and the positions of particles and their conjugate momentum
can both be regarded as well defined, relative to any question that is posed. In
that limit there is no effective quantum dispersion caused by the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle, and hence no indeterminism, and the only Heisenberg
Choices of questions about a future state that can get an answer ‘Yes’ are
those that are in accord with the functional properties of the present state.
So there would be, in that classical approximation to the quantum process
described above, a collapse of the two lines of causation, the physical and the
mental, into a single one that is fixed by the local classical deterministic rules.
Thus in the classical approximation the mental process would indeed be doing
nothing beyond what the classical physical process is already doing, and
the two process might seem to be the same process. But Planck’s constant
is not zero, and the difference from zero introduces quantum effects that
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separate the two lines of causation, and allow their different causal roles to
be distinguished.
The identity theory of mind raises puzzles. Why, in a world composed
primarily of ontologically independent micro-realities, each able to access or
know only things in its immediate microscopic environment, and each com-
pletely determined by micro-causal connections from its past, should there
be ontological realities such as conscious thoughts that can grasp or know,
as wholes, aspects of huge macroscopic collections of these micro-realities,
and that can have intentions pertaining to the future development of these
macroscopic aspects, when that future development is already completely
fixed, micro-locally, by micro-realities in the past?
The quantum treatment discloses that these puzzles arise from the con-
flation in the classical limit of two very different but interlocked causal pro-
cesses, one micro-causal, bound by the past, and blind to the future, the
other macro-causal, probing the present, and projecting to the future.
Mental Force and the Volitional Brain
The psychiatrist Jeffrey Schwartz (1999) has described a clinically suc-
cessful technique for treating patients with obsessive compulsive disorder
(OCD). The treatment is based on a program that trains the patient to
believe that his own willful redirection of his attention away from intense
urges of a kind associated with pathological activity within circuitry of the
basal ganglia, and toward adaptive functional behaviours, can, with suffi-
cient persistent effort, systematically change both the intrusive, maladaptive,
obsessive-compulsive symptoms, as well as the pathological brain activity as-
sociated with them. This treatment is in line with the quantum mechanical
understanding of mind/brain dynamics developed above, in which the men-
tal/experiential component of the causal structure enters brain dynamics via
intentions that govern attentions that influence brain activity.
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According to classical physical theory “a brain was always going to do
what it was caused to do by local mechanical disturbances,” and the idea
that one’s “will”, is actually able to cause anything at all is “a benign user
illusion”. Thus Schwartz’s treatment amounts, according to this classical
conceptualization, to deluding the patient into believing a lie: according to
that classical view Schwartz’s intense therapy causes directly, in the patients
behaviour, a mechanical shift that the patient delusionally believes is the
result of his own intense effort to redirect his activities, for the purpose of
effecting an eventual cure, but which (felt effort) is actually only a mysterious
illusionary by-product of his altered behaviour.
The presumption about the mind/brain that is the basis of Schwartz’s
successful clinical treatment, and the training of his patients, is that will-
ful redirection of attention is efficacious. His success does not prove that
‘will’ is efficacious, but it does constitute prima facie evidence that it is. In
fact, the belief that our thoughts can influence our actions is so basic to our
entire idea of ourselves and our place in nature, and is so essential to our
actual functioning in this world, that any suggestion that this idea is false
would become plausible only under extremely coercive conditions, such as its
incompatibility with basic physics. But no such coercion exists. Contempo-
rary physical theory does allow our experiences, per se, to be truly efficacious
and non-reducible: our experiences are elements of the causal structure that
do necessary things that nothing else in the theory can do. Thus science,
if pursued with sufficient care, demands no cloistering of disciplines, or in-
terpretation as user illusions of the apparent causal effects of our conscious
thoughts upon our physical actions.
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